gal scholars responded to the deconstitutionalization of Miranda by suggesting that the Court had no authority, pursuant to Article III of the federal Constitution, to reverse state criminal convictions absent an actual constitutional violation! A rogue Assistant United States Attorney and conservative law professor convinced the Fourth Circuit that a largely ignored statute Congress enacted in 1968 to overrule Miranda had done just that. 8 Finally, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, in the terribly disappointing Dickerson case reversing the Fourth Circuit, opined that Miranda has "constitutional underpinning" 9 yet still permits exclusion of "statements which may be by no means involuntary" under Fifth Amendment and due process standards,' without attempting to explain this seeming contradiction or to assess the status of Miranda's exceptions. We are left with the same questions burning before Dickerson. If Miranda is required by the Fifth Amendment, how can we admit unwarned statements into evidence in a criminal trial even for impeachment? Conversely, if Miranda is not required by the Fifth Amendment, how can we reverse state court convictions for its violation?
Professor George Thomas and I, in a recent symposium issue of the Michigan Law Review, reach the same general conmay be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation."). This list of exceptions includes Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (fruits exception where second statement obtained as a result of umwarned statement); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety exception); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975) 1117, 1124 (1978) (suggesting that prophylactic rules are "neither constitutional nor common law but pragmatism without either precedent or principle-judicial realism radicalized and rampant"). ' United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999 ) (Miranda was not a constitutional holding, and therefore 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (West 1985) successfully reversed it). "The Department ofJustice, elevating politics over law, prohibited the U.S. Attorney's Office from arguing that Dickerson's confession is admissible under the mandate of § 3501." Id. at 672.
' Dickerson, 120 U.S. at 2234. '0 Id. at 2336.
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clusions regarding both the justification of Miranda (it can be satisfactorily explained), and the fate of the pre-Dickerson exceptions to Miranda (they healthily survive). However, we reach these conclusions by radically different routes: Professor Thomas utilizes the malleable Due Process Clause," while I rely upon the flexibility of constitutional prophylactic rules.' 2 While this difference may not seem striking when focusing solely upon the Miranda warnings, it is stark when attempting to justify the Warren Court revolution as a whole, and to account for many subsequent criminal procedure holdings. Pivotal decisions outlining procedures required to uphold Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees can be properly and accurately characterized only as prophylactic rules rather than "true" constitutional edicts.' 3 Reversing every one of these decisions or shoehorning every one of these rights into the Due Process Clause would be disastrous.
In this brief commentary, I will respond to Professor Thomas' thoughtful and creative but, in my opinion, ultimately unpersuasive attempt to relocate the Miranda warnings from the A prophylactic rule is a doctrinal rule for deciding whether an explicit constitutional rule is applicable, triggered upon less than a showing that the explicit rule was violated but providing a similar remedy, and appropriate only where providing relief upon a showing of an explicit violation is ineffective and the rule is effective while involving acceptable costs); see also Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalihe Wien the Sel-Incrimination Clause and the Ciil Rights Act Col4ide 143 U. PA. L REv. 417, 482-83 (1994) (suggesting that it is the Court's obligation under the Constitution to create remedies or procedures necessary to safeguard a particular constitutional provision otherwise at risk. While these remedies and procedures may be "temporary and/or conditional" this 'constitutional common law has the same status as 'true' constitutional interpretation" for purposes of civil rights actions).
's Klein, supra note 12, at 1037-44 (providing numerous examples of prophylactic rules such as the procedure to protect an indigent defendant's right to appellate counsel in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) ; the rule establishing a prima facie case of an equal protection violation without evidence of purposeful discrimination in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) ; the presumption against multiple punishments for the same offense in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359 (1983) ; the rule against reapproaching a suspect in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) ; the presumption of incompetent counsel where there is a conflict of interest in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) ; the presumption of judicial vindictiveness in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969) ); and the exclusion of in-court identification of postindictment counselless lineup in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967) ).
Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. As a descriptive matter, the Miranda warnings were designed to prevent compelled statements in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause, not to protect due process values such as ensuring a fundamentally fair criminal trial, providing notice and an opportunity to be heard before the deprivation of a property or liberty interest, and preventing conscience shocking behavior by state actors. As a normative matter, principles of federalism and separation of powers militate strongly against an open-ended substantive or procedural due process monster. In Part I, I explain why, contrary to Professor Thomas' thesis, Miranda and its progeny do not fit comfortably (or at all, for that matter) in the Supreme Court's substantive due process, procedural due process, or administrative due process jurisprudence. Part II then clarifies why Professor Thomas' attempt to place Miranda in the Due Process Clause does not save its many exceptions.
None of my criticisms, however, detract from the key insight provided by Professor Thomas in his article-Miranda has been effectively transformed over the years from a case that all but mandated defense attorney participation in custodial interrogations to dispel inherent compulsion, to a case about providing the minimal amount of notice to a defendant about his privilege against self-incrimination such that a court can uphold his confession as voluntary. The decision, however, remains one concerned primarily with compulsion, and is concerned with notice only to the extent that notice dispels compulsion. Moreover, the answer to this unfortunate transformation is not to leave Miranda untouched and simply move it from the SelfIncrimination Clause to the Due Process Clause. The answer, instead, is to insist that the Supreme Court define what constitutes a "voluntary" confession, consider whether the Miranda warnings in fact make statements taken during custodial interrogation more or less "voluntary" than alternative procedures, and design rules to ensure that the Self-Incrimination Clause is protected in a manner the Court can enforce.
I. MIRANDA WAS DESIGNED TO DISPEL COMPULSION
Professor Thomas argues that Miranda is a case protecting three potential due process liberty interests: 1) the "liberty in-
terest in not being subjected to custodial interrogation;"" 4 2) the liberty interest in making an "an informed choice whether to answer police questions;"' s and 3) the "liberty interest not to disclose what we wish to keep secret."' 6 ' Thus, Miranda is about providing notice, not about prohibiting compulsion, and as such it reflects due process rather than self-incrimination values. Professor Thomas claims this interpretation provides a better description of Miranda and its progeny because it explains why waivers of Miranda are so easily found, 7 why non-Mirandized but clearly voluntary statements are nonetheless excluded, 8 and why sometimes the Miranda presumption of compulsion is applied and sometimes it isn't.' 9 Neither of Professor Thomas' suggestions, to relocate the Miranda warnings in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, or, less radically, to retain its status as a protector of the Self-Incrimination Clause but utilize due ?rocess values to determine when to apply the prophylaxis," are helpful. I disagree with Professor Thomas on three levels. First, I disagree with the need for shifting the Miranda warnings from the Fifth Amendment to the Due Process Clause in order to explain post-Miranda exceptions and Miranda's waiver doctrine. We are not limited to the three choices identified by Professor Thomas: 1) acceptingJustice Scalia's reasoning that Miranda has been deconstitutionalized by later cases and therefore can be ignored entirely by the states; 2) reconstitutionalizing Miranda and overruling its exceptions; or 3) finding another constitutional home for Miranda. 2 what he now calls a "weak force" constitutional rule, but dismisses this as failing to provide "a theory about why the Fifth Amendment privilege deserves a constitutional prophylaxis." I&L at 1091. I have provided just such a theory. See Klein, supra note 12, at 1032-33 (noting that where the Court is "unable to precisely track the constitutional criminal procedural guarantee before it," it often creates prophylactic rules "that assist it in identifying and adjudicating constitutional violations," and providing theoretical and practical justifications for such practice, such as the difficulty of fact-finding in certain situations, the need to guide law enforcement officials making snap judgments without legal Court could have retained the Miranda doctrine and its exceptions by properly labeling it a constitutional prophylactic rule, defining what that is, and detailing why a prophylactic rule was necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. 2 My approach reaps the same advantage of flexibility of deciding when to apply the rule, what exceptions to create, and what form of waiver to require that Professor Thomas claims for his theory. Instead of a general and vague balancing of "fairness to the suspect on one side and the interest of the state in accurate fact-finding on the other," 23 the flexibility of a prophylactic rule consists of applying it only where the rule is necessary to fulfill its function. We should judge whether the prophylactic rule is effective in dispelling the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation and in assisting the Court in adjudicating claims of a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. We should consider the costs of lost confessions only to the extent that the prophylactic rule over-protects the privilege or fails to assist law enforcement and the courts in obeying and adjudicating the privilege. 4 Moreover, a significant advantage to my approach is that it allows Congress, state legislatures, and state and federal law enforcement departments to share in fashioning any prophylactic rules necessary to protect the privilege, though the final decision still rests with the Court.25
My second level of disagreement with Professor Thomas' solution is that the Miranda decision does not fit comfortably, as either a normative or descriptive proposition, in the Due Process Clause. My final criticism is that moving Miranda to the Due Process Clause would not make post-Miranda cases coherent. I will start with the former claim. Before we can discuss whether Miranda can be redescribed as a due process case we must isotraining, the reality that the Court has limited time to hear individual cases, and the high stakes of underprotecting constitutional rights where liberty is at stake).
2See Klein, supra note 12, at 1071-77 (arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist failed miserably on all counts in Dickerson).
Thomas, supra note 11, at 1117. 2' See Klein, supra note 12, at 1032-37, Appendix A at 1079 (suggesting that unlike explicit constitutional interpretation, subconstitutional doctrines such as prophylactic rules, to the extent they overprotect the constitutional right at issue, can be created, excepted and modified to account for costs such as lost convictions).
See id at 1052-68 (arguing that prophylactic rules encourage dialogue and cooperation between the federal judiciary and state and federal executive and legislative officers, fosters experimentation with new procedures that may work better, and provides the flexibility to respond to new empirical and social science data without reversing constitutional decisions).
[Vol. 91
late what kind of due process Professor Thomas has in mind. The Court generally divides Fourteenth Amendment due process into three component parts.' First, it selectively incorporates specific provisions defined in the Bill of Rights. Second, the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that prevents the government from engaging in conduct that "shocks the conscience," ' 8 or enacting legislation which interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 2 9 regardless of the fairness of the procedures used. Third, the Due Process Clause guarantees that government action depriving a person of life, liberty or property be implemented in a fair manner. The third component, procedural due process, can further be subdivided into procedural due process as applied to criminal actions, 3 ' and procedural due process as applied to civil and administrative actions. 2 Though Professor Thomas does not tell us into which of these categories of due process he would place the Miranda warnings, they fit into none. I do not say this because I believe, as Professor Thomas suggests, that the existence of criminal procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights "sucked most of the 'criminal process' oxygen from the Due Process Clause."" Rather, I fully agree that both history and text support the idea that due process has independent life in both the criminal and civil contexts apart from the particular provisions in the Bill of Rights.34 However, I do believe, as does the present Court, that See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL P,CRI MINAL PROCEDURE § § 2.2-2.7 (2d ed. 1999) (providing a lucid description of the three components of due process, the arguments for and against total and selective incorporation, and the impact of incorporation on the fundamental fairness doctrine).
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that privilege against selfincrimination was a fundamental right, thus guarantee "would be enforced against the State under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards" as against the federal government).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952 
A. MIRANDA AS SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS"'
The line between substantive and procedural due process is not clearly drawn. The Court has identified certain legislative" 0 and executive action that simply cannot be countenanced regardless of the procedures used. I would add that the law or executive action must not infringe on interests related to the fairness of the trial (though a substantive due process claim may also result in a claim as to the procedures involved at trial). In other words, the individual's substantive rights are violated independent of his right to fair adjudication in a criminal trial, and the violation of these substantive rights results in an immediate constitutional violation that demands a remedy (though it may also require the exclusion of evidence in a subsequent criminal adjudication). We may fit Professor Thomas' understanding of Miranda into the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment using this definition. Under Professor Thomas' theory, a suspect has a substantive right to be free of custodial interrogation without Miranda-style notice that he need not answer questions, and/or in maintainparallels that of the Fifth Amendment). Regardless of the intent of the framer's of the Bill of Rights and drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has utilized the fundamental fairness doctrine since reconstruction, and is unlikely to stop now.
" The first component of the Due Process Clause, the incorporation doctrine, is clearly inapplicable. 6The use of substantive due process to restrict the content of substantive criminal law is not relevant to Thomas' proposal In the interest of full disclosure, since I am criticizing Professor Thomas' attempt to use due process as overly subjective, I must admit that NancyJ. King and I have recently devised a sixth factor substantive due process test for determining when the government can partially circumvent constitutional criminal procedural guarantees by labeling a fact an affirmative defense or a sentencing factor instead of an element. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1467 REv. , 1535 REv. -42 (2001 . I note that in this situation, as in the situation where the legislature attempts to completely circumvent criminal procedural guarantees by labeling an action "civil," substantive due process is absolutely essential to our constitutional architecture. Thomas' utilization of the Due Process Clause is absolutely unnecessary in light of the Miranda Court's decision to apply the Fifth Amendment at the station house.
574
[Vol. 91
ing his innermost thoughts. 7 Such interests are clearly not tied to the truthseeking function of adjudication, though they may result in a claim as to the procedure involved in his criminal trial. For example, the suspect may seek to exclude evidence obtained in violation of his substantive right. Rather than implementing a set of procedures to adjudicate this newly created liberty interest in receiving Miranda-style warnings, Professor Thomas appears to claim that while countervailing law enforcement interests may be adequate, no set of procedures will ever be enough to deprive a person of his interest in notice. This same definition would include the substantive due process right to be free from stomach pumping recognized by the Court in Rochin v. Cal fornia,s the right not to be forcibly medicated in the absence of a showing that the medication was medically appropriate recognized by the Court by Riggins v. Nevada, 9 and potentially the right of an actually innocent person not to be executed by the state, mentioned by the Court in Herrera v. Collins. 4 0 Though the Court did not, I would include in this list the whippings barred by Brown v. Mississippi, 4 ' which seems to me an immediate and actionable wrong regardless of whether evidence obtained by the torture is offered at a criminal trial.
42
'7Thomas, supra note 11, at 1114-15. "' 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that the violation of bodily integrity inherent in enforced stomach pumping shocks the conscience of the Court).
'9 504 U.S. 127 (1992). ' 506 U. S. 390 (1993) . 4' 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (criminal conviction based upon confession obtained by a white state official severely whipping an African-American defendant offended the fundamental traditions and conscience of society, and therefore "the use of the confession . . . obtained [through physical torture] as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process.").
As a procedural due process case, it probably could not sustain a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All the procedure due persons in such cases is the exclusion of any evidence obtained by these deprivations in a criminal trial, and the availability of a state tort or criminal law remedy. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) . The attempt to find a substantive due process home for a Miranda violation will fail for three reasons. First, there is no liberty interest as described by Professor Thomas that history, tradition, current American consensus, or state law establishes as being worthy of due process protections. The Court has been understandably reluctant to extend substantive due process beyond "matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. 43 Since the Miranda warnings protect none of these interests, that alone should end the matter. The Court has also made clear that it will not recognize any substantive due process liberty interests occasioned by an arrest beyond the protections already provided by the Fourth Amendment." That, again, should end the matter. However, even assuming the Court would be willing to add additional liberty protections, precisely what Professor Thomas offers as his new liberty interest is not entirely clear. On one reading of his theory, it is an interest in obtaining the warnings themselves, 5 on another it is a liberty interest in being free from custodial interrogation," and a third possibility is the interest in not revealing one's "inner- " See, e.g., Albright, 510 U.S. at 274 (holding that the matter of pre-trial deprivation of liberty addressed by the Fourth Amendment); see also Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 679-80 (holding that the deprivation of liberty occasioned by an arrest does not trigger the strict judicial scrutiny of substantive due process because the system provides adequate procedural control such as warrants and judicial determinations of probable cause); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 833 (holding that substantive due process analysis appropriate for high speed police chase case because victim was not yet seized, and therefore the conduct was not covered by the Fourth Amendment).
" Professor Thomas writes that "Miranda is about fair notice that suspects have no duty to answer police questions." Thomas, supra note 11 at 1102. He also claims that there is a "due process right to notice that suspects do not have to answer police questions ..... Id. at 1104. Professor Thomas comments that "a... due process liberty interest is the suspect's option to make an informed choice whether to answer police questions and risk providing the state with evidence against him that increases the risk of conviction." Id. at 1114.
16 Professor Thomas contends that "a permissible understanding of Miranda is that it protects the liberty interest in not being subjected to custodial interrogation.. ." Id. at 1091. He argues that "The denial of autonomy and human dignity by custodial interrogation might constitute a deprivation of a due process liberty interest." Id. at 1112.
See id., at 1115. teenth Amendments. I will start with a liberty interest in notice that one need not answer police questions, regardless of whether any subsequent cooperation or revelation was voluntary or compelled. A requirement of notice outside the trial setting regarding constitutional criminal procedural guarantees has been routinely rejected by the Court. In addition to the lack of any constitutional or historical basis for a notice requirement, this practice reflects, in part, the lack of a principled basis for determining when and how much notice is required. For example, how is the Court to decide which specific constitutional criminal protections trigger an independent Due Process Clause right to be notified that one's conduct might impair the future utilization of this right? Why not require police to notify an individual that he need not consent to a search in order to protect his Fourth Amendment right to a judicial warrant based upon probable cause? 49 Should the government give notice to a suspect that one of his "friends" is actually an undercover operative working for the police, in order to protect his Sixth Amendment right to counsel? 0 Should a suspect be informed that the invocation of his right to remain silent allows reapproach by an officer to interrogate on a different offense, whereas his invocation of his right to an attorney does not? 1 Must the defendant 'a I will not discuss the third proposed liberty interest. An extensive and complex body of jurisprudence under the First Amendments free speech and Fifth Amendmen's Self-Incrimination Clause already protects freedom of thought. Throwing free standing or substantive due process into the mix adds nothing but confusion.
49 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that knowledge of right to refuse consent to search simply one factor in determining whether consent voluntarily given, for purposes of determining whether the warrant or probable cause clauses are triggered).
Compare Must an individual detained pursuant to a valid traffic stop be informed that the traffic stop is over and that he is free to go before the officer may engage in further questioning? 53 Must an individual be informed that there is a method for recovery of property seized pursuant to a valid search warrant? 54 Must an individual be informed that he can refuse to answer non-custodial questions by federal law enforcement agents in order to protect his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in a future criminal trial against him involving the answers to those questions? 55 Must an individual be Mirandized by a government agent requesting an oral or written factual declaration in order to protect his privilege against selfincrimination? 56 The Court has answered each of these questions in the negative. It is incumbent upon the individual to be aware of and assert his rights. " See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (rejecting per se rule that the traffic stop becomes an illegal detention unless the officer informs the detainee that he is free to go before requesting consent to search his car).
" See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999) (holding that when police seize property pursuant to a search warrant for a criminal investigation, due process does not require that they provide the owner with notice of state law remedies which are established by published, generally available state statutes in caselaw); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (d) (providing that federal agents give subject of search a copy of the warrant, but making no provision for notifying the subject about the procedures for seeking return of property).
" See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (holding that defendant's denial of a bribery allegation to federal agents questioning him violates 18 U.S.C. § 1001 proscription against false statements, "exculpatory no" doctrine is not required by the privilege against self-incrimination despite suspect's fear that his silence will be used against him later or his lack of knowledge that silence was an available option).
56 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (affirming guilty plea to violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316, where defendant lied to customs inspector when asked, without Miranda warnings, whether he had currency in excess of $10,000 to declare, but upholding Ninth Circuit determination that criminal forfeiture of entire $357,144 constituted an excessive fine); see also Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (holding that defendant can assert Fifth Amendment privilege to preclude criminal punishment for refusing to comply with occupational tax statute where payment subjects taxpayer to substantial hazard of federal and state criminal wagering prosecution).
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Professor Thomas cannot explain why there is no liberty interest in notice of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment criminal procedural protections outside of the trial setting, but there is a liberty interest in notice that one need not answer questions when in police custody. He does attempt to justify giving a due process notice right to Miranda warnings yet offering no due process notice of a Fourth Amendment right to refuse to give consent to a search, stating that the difference is in:
... the level of pressure between typical cases of police approaching an inaividual on the street and asking a question, and police conducting a sustained interrogation of a suspect who is under arrest. Under arrest, in an unfamiliar room, suspects face police interrogators who are capable of relentless questionifig and who imply, if they do not state, that the suspect must answer. This is about as extreme a pressure to answer as interro tion can get short of physical threats or physical coercion.
This justification is an admission that Professor Thomas is not concerned with a suspect obtaining information or notice that he is free to refuse to answer questions, but rather is concerned that the suspect be free from compulsion. Notice is necessary here only to dispel compulsion. This brings us right back to the privilege against self-incrimination.5
Moreover, once we accept a new liberty interest in notice regarding the privilege against the Self-Incrimination Clause's freedom from answering questions that might incriminate one in a criminal trial, why stop at the four Miranda warnings in describing this liberty interest? If Professor Thomas is truly worried about "the unfairness which comes with making a choice based on incomplete or false information, ' " ' 9 why not require officers to give notice to arrestees that they will lie to them during the custodial interrogation? How about telling the suspect that his attorney, were he to ask for one, would certainly insist that he remain silent? How about notice to the suspect that if he re--' Thomas, supra note 11, at 1102-03.
' Unlike the lack of Miranda-style warnings outside the trial setting found in the Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, and Brogan, 522 U.S. 398, cases, the Supreme Court has declined to decide whether a grand jury witness must be varned of her Fifth Amendment privilege. See United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 190-91 (1977) . However, whichever way it may eventually rule, it is clearly a Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination issue, not one of due process.
S9 Thomas, supra note 11, at 1105.
fuses to waive his Miranda rights, his statements may still be used to impeach him and to obtain leads as to other evidence and witnesses? There is simply no principled stopping point for determining how much notice is required. Next, let us suppose this liberty interest is the freedom from the custodial interrogation itself. If by this Professor Thomas means the right to be free from custodial interrogations that compel a statement from a suspect, he is correct but his theory is unnecessary. Forcing a suspect to talk by prolonged interrogation or other coercive means would, of course, make the statement involuntarl under the Fifth Amendment's SelfIncrimination Clause. If Professor Thomas means the freedom of a suspect not be subjected to any police questioning at all, he is incorrect. Questioning a suspect, even without giving him notice that he need not answer these questions, is insufficiently shocking to constitute a violation of substantive due process. Though Professor Thomas and his students apparently disagree, I suspect many people see nothing "fundamentally unfair" or "shocking" about the police asking a suspect to explain himself once there has been sufficient indication he has committed a crime to justify an arrest. In fact, short of actual compulsion," 1 the Court has acknowledged a "need for police questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal law. Without such investigation, those who are innocent might be falsely accused, those who are guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved." 62 Thus we force witnesses and suspects into the grandjury,3 and even onto the stand of a criminal case not their own. Like a suspect suffering custodial interrogation, individuals subpoenaed to the grand jury or a criminal 60 SeeMalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). [Vol. 91 trial have no liberty interest in freedom from the prosecutorial interrogation. Similarly, the government requires the producdon of financial and other information that may be incriminating in filings such as federal income tax forms" and in reports submitted at the international border on pain of criminal sanction. Though, like a suspect suffering custodial interrogation, they may assert their privilege, they have no liberty interest in freedom from filling out the forms.
Cases where the Court did find police conduct to be shocking all involved instances of intentional police brutality that directly resulted in serious physical injury.6 The Court was not shocked by reckless police behavior that directly caused the death of innocent persons,O nor was it shocked by intentional omissions that indirectly resulted in the death of innocent persons." It seems more than an overstatement to describe a world without Miranda as shocking, or as depriving the defendant of "that fumdamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."' 7 Police conduct in questioning a suspect, questioning him without providing the Miranda warnings, and attempting to get him to reveal his participation in a crime is simply not comparable to the forced emetic administered in Rochin. I find even that case questionable under the present interpretation of the substantive Due Process Clause (though happily covered now by S. 165 (1952) .
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (holding that police recklessly engaging in a high speed chase resulting in the death of a citizen %,as not sufficiently egregious to shock the conscience).
' See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992) (holding that city's failure to train or warn its employees about known hazards beneath the city streets, resulting in death by asphyxia in a manhole, was insufficiently shocking to constitute a violation of substantive due process); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that substantive due process guarantee against state deprivation of safety does not apply to social workers who have no affirmative duty to prevent a parent from maiming his child, even where the worker had knowledge of the abuse).
'Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941 stantive due process and the merits of prior cases, however, a Miranda violation isn't even close.
A third reason why an attempt to place Miranda in the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment fails is the Court's wise holding that where a particular constitutional guarantee protects against a particular type of challenged government action, "that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing [those] claims. '77 This rule makes good sense in a post-selective incorporation world for exactly the same reason that the Court shifted in the 1960s from the fundamental fairness standard to the selective incorporation doctrine. That is, the Court is reluctant to "expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decision-making in this chartered area are scarce and open-ended, '' 8 or, as Justice Scalia said more colorfully, it turns the Court into a "nineheaded Caesar." ' The argument in favor of both total and selective incorporation 8 of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment is that it avoids the subjectivity inherent in the application of the fundamental fairness doctrine preincorporation.
This more-specific-provision rule cuts off Professor Thomas' due process proposal, and should cause the Court to recharacterize some older substantive due process cases should that same misconduct arise in a post-selective-incorporation world. It cuts off Professor Thomas' claim because the Miranda warnGraham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force must be anal)zed under the Fourth Amendment and not the substantive Due Process Clause); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (refusing to recognize a substantive due process right to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause, finding instead that the Fourth Amendment addresses the matter of pre-trial deprivations of liberty). 
").
8 Selective incorporation is less subjective than fundamental fairness in two ways: 1) it points to a textual source of the right; and 2) once the right is incorporated the scope of the right is dependent upon case law surrounding that constitutional clause, there is no discretion in deciding which parts of the clause are necessary to ordered liberty.
[Vol. 91 ings protect a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, and as such ought to be analyzed under the Self-Incrimination Clause. Rochin v. California 8 2 would certainly be treated as a Fourth Amendment case after Graham v. Connor. 3 Cases such as Brown v. Mississippe' would likely be viewed today as either Fourth or Fifth Amendment rather than substantive due process cases."" That the Miranda warnings are better placed in the Fifth Amendment than in substantive due process is evident from Professor Thomas' own explanation of the value of providing such notice. He claims that notice is needed 1) because suspects otherwise believe they have a legal duty to answer police questions; 2) to assist suspects in making an informed choice whether to answer police questions and risk providing the state with evidence against them; and 3) because suspects will otherwise forfeit their liberty interest in choosing whether to reveal their innermost thoughts. As an empirical matter I believe the need for Miranda warnings solely to provide "notice" is, at this point in time, superfluous. After the wave of television cop shows from Hill Street Blues to NYPD Blue, any American with a TV set has some awareness of the Miranda warnings. 6 But even 82342 U.S. 165 (1952) . 83 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) . The Court said as much in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998) (explaining that Rochin "was decided long before Graham v. Connor. . . and today would be treated under the Fourth Amendment, albeit with the same result.").
8 297 U. S. 278 (1936) . The value I see in calling coerced confessions a violation of substantive due process rather than the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause is that this will allow coerced persons to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim despite the fact that a confession may never have been given, or, if given, may never have been used in Court, and therefore the Fifth Amendment was never violated. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1991 621, 651 (1996) (noting that 93% surveyed in a national poll knew they had a right to an attorney if arrested, and 80% of the respondents in another poll knew they had a right to remain silent if arrested). Of course being able to partially recite the warnings may be a far cry from actually understanding and being able to apply the warnings. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. Rv. 1134 L. Rv. (1980 (finding that many adults failed to fully understand all four warnings even after the recitation, and contending that they would have to explain their criminal involvement in court if questioned by thejudge). However, if I'm wrong, and a suspect does lack notice that he can terminate the interview and keep those innermost thoughts all to himself, why do these particular kinds of erroneous beliefs bother us any more than the hundreds of other erroneous factual beliefs held by citizens regarding the criminal justice system and life in general? It bothers us because we fear that otherwise, suspects will be compelled to speak against their will. The act of notice by the interrogating police officer reassures the defendant that the officer is prepared to recognize the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege, and will not attempt to badger or beat a statement out of him. 7 Thus, Miranda protects a quintessential Fifth Amendment value.
B. MIRANDA AS CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
It sometimes appears that Professor Thomas makes a procedural due process claim as when, for example, he tell us there is a "free standing due process protection by which state criminal proceedings can be evaluated." ' s He also appears to make this claim when he analogizes Miranda to other criminal procedural due process cases such as Pennsylvania v. Ritchie and Chambers v. Mississippi. 90 As with substantive due process, we must first find a liberty or property interest that is being infringed by the state. I have already explained why I believe Thomas' notion of a liberty interest to information regarding whether one can cut off questioning, to information whether one needs to Thomas does not cure these defects. He does not require officers or more neutral parties to actually explain the warnings; he simply moves their constitutional home.
If Miranda warnings were terminated, however, it may be true that over time, depending upon reruns, they would fade from popular media and thus from public awareness as well. Or we might imagine a world without the Miranda decision. In that case, a suspect is in the same position regarding her fifth-amendment rights as she is with all others criminal procedure rights-she can learn them herself or ask the officer for information. Moreover, neither Professor Thomas nor I are proposing to eliminate the warnings, nor do we suggest it was a mistake to institute them. Our difference is simply in whether they are more accurately described and more appropriately placed in the privilege against self-incrimination or free-standing substantive or procedural due process.
See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 8sThomas, supra note 11, at 1096. 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (holding that the state is obliged to provide the defense with subpoena access to possibly favorable agency records).
410 U.S. 284 (1973) (holding that due process requires right to cross-examine hostile defense witnesses and offer testimony of defense witnesses).
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One could instead posit that a liberty interest is infringed upon by the state when the state attempts to incarcerate a defendant through a criminal trial that utilizes procedures that violate fundamental fairness. There are two problems with this procedural due process proposal. The first is that virtually all practices struck down on this ground, pre-, peri-and postselective incorporation, impinged upon the truthseeking function of the trial. Cases regulating the standard and burdens of proof in a criminal trial, 9 securing the right to present a de-92 fense, prohibiting prejudicial delay in the bringing of charges, 9 and requiring an impartial judge, 4 all ensure the reliability of the verdict and can stake some claim to either history or consensus. A trial conducted with evidence obtained in violation of Miranda but not the Fifth Amendment's Self-" See Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that due process requires that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for an offense beyond the prescribed statutory maximum be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (holding that state cannot prosecute an individual who has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he is incompetent to stand trial); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (striking down misleadingjury instructions as to reasonable doubt standard); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (rejecting conclusive presumptions); In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring the state to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
2 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (prohibiting intentional destruction of or failure to preserve exculpatory evidence); see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding that defendant has constitutional right to testify at her own trial); Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (state obliged to provide the defense with subpoena access to possibly favorable agency records); United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667 (1985) (requiring prosecutor to disclose evidence necessary to impeach government witnesses); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (providing indigent who has shown his sanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial with access to experts to establish insanity defense); Chambers, 410 U.S. 284 (right to cross-examine hostile defense witness and offer testimony of defense witnesses); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory materials to the defense).
'9 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 326 (1971) (rejecting the defendant's claim of prejudicial delay in bringing an indictment because it was brought within the statute of limitations, but nevertheless noting "the real possibility of prejudice inherent in any extended delay-that memories will dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and evidence be lost").
" See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (holding that defendant has a due process right to an unbiased judge); see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (holding that defendant had a due process right to an impartial judge with no pecuniary interest in obtaining a conviction); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (holding that defendant had a due process right to a trial free from mob domination).
Incrimination Clause is still a trial that is fundamentally fair, and will generate a reliable verdict.
A second roadblock to a procedural due process right to Miranda warnings is that the Court has instituted the same more-specific-provision rule as in the substantive due process area. First in Dowling v. United States 9
? " and then in Medina v. California, 95 the Court held that the primary source of regulation of state criminal trials is the criminal procedural guarantees selectively incorporated into the Due Process Clause. The Court is reticent to expand procedural due process beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights because:
... [t] Thus, most of the procedural due process protections discussed above involve issues unregulated by any more specific clause of the Bill of Rights. The values underlying the Miranda warnings are Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination values. The giving of the warnings does not generally make the trial more fair, at least in the sense of making the result more accurate or reliable.
Professor Thomas argues that the Warren Court might have easily used the line of procedural due process cases rather than the Self-Incrimination Clause in deciding Miranda.0 It seems to me that an even stronger argument for moving Miranda to the procedural component of the Due Process Clause even after the Court's more-specific-provision rule is that the Court continues to use procedural due process as well as the Self-Incrimination Clause as the rationale for excluding actually coerced confessions, as opposed to excluding Miranda violations.9 This prac--493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) tice can be explained, however, in two ways. First, the use of due process is primarily due to the historical accident that particularly egregious coerced confession cases occurred before the Self-Incrimination Clause was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states.'o These state police practices had to be stopped and, prior to Malloy, it was due process or bust.' 0 ' Second, using the "due process" rather than "Self-Incrimination Clause" label allows the Court to easily distinguish actually compelled confessions from voluntary confessions taken in violation of Miranda.1 2 Due process has simply become shorthand for compelled statements, though a selfincrimination violation, as incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, is a more accurate description.
C. MIRANDA AS ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
Finally, Professor Thomas might be suggesting that the Miranda warnings are protected by the notice and opportunity to be heard that procedural due process requires before liberty or property is taken away in an administrative or civil setting. Professor Thomas focuses on a line of cases requiring notice of any hearing that might lead to a deprivation of property or liberty, and that use a balancing test to determine what kind of notice and procedures are required by the Due Process Clause. He cites the seminal due process notice case in civil procedure, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,' 0° which required a prevent a state prisoner from simply converting his barred Miranda claim into a due process claim that his conviction rested on an involuntary confession."); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) ('The Court has retained this due process focus, even after holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) , that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies to the States") (citation omitted).
" See Malloy, 378 U.S. 1 ("Whenever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by [the self-incrimination] portion of the Fifth Amendment.") (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897)).
'0' Federal police practices were controlled by the Fifth Amendment's SelfIncrimination Clause. See Bratn, 168 U.S. 532.
O2 See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993); see also Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, was it Ovended, or is it Irrelevant., 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 499-502 (1998) (noting that once the Miranda issue is addressed, many lower courts neglect to inquire into the voluntariness of the resulting confession).
'0' 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (holding that individual beneficiaries have a due process right to notice of a hearing before the bank closes a trust; representation by a special bank to mail notice to known beneficiaries of a trust before that trust could be closed. Professor Thomas also cites to Morrissey v. Brewel 4 and Wolff v. McDonnel, ' 5 two other due process cases. In Morrissey, the Court held that the Iowa Board of Parole had to hold an administrative hearing prior to revoking the defendant's parole and that the defendant must be given notice of the hearing and an opportunity to challenge the allegation that he violated parole by buying a car under an assumed name. In McDonnell the Court held that the Nebraska Department of Prisons must give notice and an opportunity to be heard to prisoner Mr. McDonnell before depriving him of good time credit and privileges and confining him in a disciplinary cell as punishment for misconduct. There are a number of insurmountable hurdles to applying the rationale of these cases to the Miranda situation.
The first problem, already covered in my discussion of substantive due process, is the lack of any liberty interest being taken without due process. Mr. Mullane had a state-created property interest in the corpus of the trust,' O Mr. Morrissey had a state-created liberty interest in the continuation of parole so long as he abided by its conditions, ' 7 and Mr. McDonnell had a state-created liberty interest in retaining his good time credits and privileges absent serious prison misconduct.'O s There is clearly no state-created liberty interest in receiving Miranda warnings, "' and, as noted in my substantive due process discussion, the Court has time and again rejected any constitutional right to notice of criminal procedural guarantees outside the criminal trial setting." guardian constitutionally insufficient where the bank knew the names and addresses of the interested parties) (cited by Thomas, supra note 11, at 1114 Second, the purpose of this procedural due process notice requirement is to ensure that the person whose property or liberty interest will be infringed attends and is properly prepared for a hearing, so he has the opportunity to present evidence and make arguments before his property or liberty interest is extinguished. Professor Thomas does not intend to give suspects a hearing, administrative or otherwise, regarding the deprivation of their liberty interest in receiving the Miranda warnings. There are simply no facts to contest were we to hold such a hearing. In Morrissey and McDonnell, it is appropriate for the state to deprive those individuals of good time credits and parole rights if, in fact, the individuals violated the parole conditions or prison disciplinary rules. The hearing is necessary to determine whether the violations occurred. Professor Thomas provides no standard for when it is acceptable for the state to deprive someone of their liberty interest in receiving notice of their Fifth Amendment right and notice that they need not reveal their innermost thoughts, or what would be argued at a hearing regarding such deprivation.
II. SHIFTING MIRANDA TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE WILL NOT SAVE ITS EXCEPTIONS
Perhaps we could live with a due process theory, despite its doctrinal shortcomings, if this theory accomplished Professor Thomas' stated goals of explaining waivers, justifying the overprotection of the Self-Incrimination Clause, and accounting for Miranda's exceptions, especially if there were no better alternative." 2 However, my final disagreement with Professor Thomas regards these claims. In fact, his theory does not adequately ex- § 3551 (1984) , as requiring that a criminal defendant be given notice before a district court departs upward from the Sentencing Guidelines so that he may contest the fact upon which the court bases the upward departure, and noting that an interpretation that did not require notice in such a circumstance would cause serious constitutional problems); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that a state employee must be given a hearing before being terminated for cause); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (requiring clear and convincing evidence before the State can civilly commit an insane individual); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (finding a full evidentiary hearing after the termination of disability benefits sufficient).
112 SeeThomas, supra note 11, at 1098-1101.
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plain any of what he calls "Mirandds mysteries."'" It is true that trial rights are less easily waived than Miranda rights. However, moving Miranda to the Due Process Clause does not provide a justification for this difference. First of all, it does not explain why the Self-Incrimination Clause is also easily waived on the witness stand, even during a grand jury proceeding.1 4 I doubt Professor Thomas is willing to say an assertion of the privilege in those situations is also a due process rather than a Fifth Amendment right. Moreover, Professor Thomas fails to explain why the waiver of a due process liberty interest should be waived "carelessly, inattentively, and without counsel,"" 5 but a SelfIncrimination Clause waiver should not be. A better response is that by agreeing to answer questions, a suspect is waiving his right, under the prophylactic rule of Miranda, to a presumption of compulsion. The standard for this waiver should not necessarily be the same standard for waiving a trial right. Rather, it should reflect whether the purposes underlying the prophylactic rule-to dispel compulsion, guide officer conduct, and ease Court adjudication-is served by that particular standard." 6 We should not be surprised to find that waiver of a prophylactic right is easier to accomplish than waiver of a true constitutional right.
Professor Thomas further claims that his due process test will retain all of Miranda's exceptions, such as the admission in a prosecutor's case-in-chief of incriminating statements made in the absence of Miranda warnings where the questioning was necessary for public safety,"' the exception allowing statements taken in violation of Miranda to impeach a defendant should he take the stand," 8 and the exception allowing derivative evidence in a prosecutor's case-in-chief that was obtained as the fruits of a Miranda violation.' 9 George Thomas fairly chides the Court for never providing a standard as to when Miranda's warnings and exceptions should come into play and when they should not.z" Had he received his due process right to notice as Professor Thomas envisions, he would have gotten it before the first statement and probably would never have made the second.'2 Likewise, it is challenging to justify the admission of the fruits of the Miranda violation in Michigan v. Tucker, as again the defendant failed to receive the required notice of his rights. 26 Finally, the application of the rule in Edwards v. Arizona, excluding even voluntary statements made during a second interrogation after the invocation of a Miranda right during a previous interrogation, fails under a notice theory because the defendant did receive notice of his Miranda warnings prior to both sets of custodial interrogations. 27 Next, Professor Thomas claims that even where notice is not provided, his due process test is flexible enough to retain the exceptions by its ability to balance a suspect's interest in fairness and notice against the state's interest in admission of trustworthy evidence.
Unfortunately, this kind of balancing is not ap-121 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652. In Quarks, an officer asked an apprehended rape suspect about the location of a gun in a public supermarket without Mirandizing him.
'2 470 U. S. 298 (1985) .
2 SeeThomas, supra note 11, at 1111. S. 197 (1977) . "3 Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter made the same argument in Burns, 501 U. S. 129, 147-48 (1991) (Soutcr, J., dissenting) .
"4 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (holding that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands," and balancing the individual's interest in liberty against the risk to society that the parolee will commit additional antisocial acts); McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556 (holding that minimal procedural requirements under due process are determined by a "mutual accomodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.").
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First, the right to notice before the deprivation of a liberty or property interest is a bright line with very little balancing, unlike the right to certain procedures. Where the identity of the party is known, due process requires individual notice. Very occasionally, the Court balances the costs and benefits of providing notice to those affected, but only where notice is difficult to provide because the identities of those with an interest are not readily ascertainable.'s6 In the custodial interrogation setting, the government always knows the identity of the individual meriting notice, and the monetary and logistical cost of notice to that individual is nil.
Second, the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test is used to determine what kind of procedures the government must use in a hearing to adjudicate a liberty or property right, not to determine whether there will be any adjudication at all. A court balances three factors: 1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation, and the value of additional procedural safeguard; and 3) the government's interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens, 13 ' in order to determine whether more or better procedures are indicated. What Professor Thomas is asking is not what kind of procedures or method of adjudication we ought to use in deciding whether to violate the individual's liberty interest in receiving his Miranda warnings, but the substantive question of whether and under what circumstances we ought to deprive him of that liberty interest entirely, procedures be damned. In other words, he is asking whether the government's interest in crime fighting and truth seeking is sufficiently high that we ought to deprive the individual of his liberty interest period, by either not giving the warnings at all or giving the warnings but then ignoring the individual's invocation of his rights. 
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This is not a due process balancing test, but a Fifth Amendment balancing test.'m Viewing Miranda and its exceptions as part of a prophylactic rule designed to protect Fifth Amendment values, as I recommend, we ought to be asking entirely different questions. First, does the exclusion of evidence taken in violation of the Miranda rule further the goals of dissipating the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, easing the Court's task in determining whether statements were compelled, and providing guidance to law enforcement officers in obtaining statements? Second, do the exceptions to this rule compromise its efficacy?' s9 The answers to these questions should come not solely from the Court but from Congress, state legislators, and social scientists. " O The process by which our society develops these rules and considers whether they are functioning properly should not be limited to the Self-Incrimination Clause, but should be more generally applicable to all rules designed to safeguard constitutional criminal procedural guarantees.
Finally, Professor Thomas' last Miranda mystery, the exclusion of voluntary statements, is easily explained by the very definition of prophylactic rules. When it is impossible to precisely track the constitutional clause at issue, the Court is forced to either over or underprotect. I call the subconstitutional doctrines '13 I believe that all constitutional clauses are subject, in the most extreme cases, to a balancing of harms test one cannot yell "fire" in a crowded theater despite the First Amendment. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (law enforcement can search without a warrant where a life is at stake despite the Fourth Amendment). However, the balancing of the individual's right to silence versus law enforcement need for information in the ordinary case was resolved in favor of the individual by the enactment of the privilege against self-incrimination.
's' I believe this responds to Professor Thomas' primary criticism of my approachthat relying on the good faith nature of the Miranda violation to determine exclusion has nothing to do with the Self-Incrimination Clause, unless one believes that an intentional violation more likely leads to a coerced confession. Thomas, supra note 11, at 1118-19. First, it does appear to me true that if an officer refuses to offer Miranda warnings, or offers them but then ignores their invocation, the suspect might rightly feel that he privilege will not be honored. More importantly, determining the contours and areas of application for a prophylactic rule is not dependent upon it reflecting the values of the constitutional clause it is protecting, but rather upon its efficiency in protecting that clause. While an intentional or accidentally caused compulsion may equally violate the Self-Incrimination Clause, it may well be that Miranda's prophylactic rule will effectively protect the privilege if complied with in good faith, but not adequately protect the privilege if intentionally flouted.
"' Klein, supra note 12, at 1057-68.
the Court uses to do this prophylactic rules and safe harbors. 4 ' The decision as to which device is more appropriate will depend entirely upon the purpose of the constitutional clause and the reason the Court is unable to provide more explicit constitutional interpretation.
III. CONCLUSION I applaud Professor Thomas' goal of granting the Court some flexibility both in crafting Miranda warnings and in delineating Miranda exceptions. However, enshrining Miranda in due process divorces it from the values animating the warnings, and subjects the Court to the charge of judicial usurpation of executive and legislative functions, in imposing its own collective opinion in the guise of a constitutional mandate. Professor Thomas' placement of Miranda's prophylactic rule into the Due Process Clause solves the legitimacy question only for that single decision. Unless Professor Thomas is willing to move every other prophylactic rule into the Due Process Clause as well, or to eliminate them entirely, he doesn't fully resolve Miranda's mysteries. My more complete and conceptually pleasing proposal not only resolves what Professor Thomas calls the three Miranda mysteries, but also accounts for many similar doctrinal devices, and their mysteries, throughout constitutional criminal procedure. It does this by sharing power with the other branches of the federal and state governments, rather than usurping their authority. Finally, it will stimulate social science empirical research into the facts on the ground and alternative improved procedures.
